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Easier Set Than Done: Stakeholder Engagement as Public- 
Private Partnership in Regulatory Policy of South Korea† 
By JONGYEARN LEE* 
An emphasis on public-private partnership (PPP) in the regulatory 
policy process can overcome the challenges hindering regulatory 
effectiveness with the emergence of fast developing technologies and 
new industries. This study attempts to evaluate quantitatively different 
aspects of institutional settings of South Korean regulatory policy in 
terms of stakeholder engagement as PPP, using evidence-based data 
released by the OECD. From the results of the principal component 
analysis, South Korea can be evaluated as being at a very good level 
overall in its institutional establishment. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
outcome of regulatory reforms in South Korea is still insufficient 
compared with this well-established system suggests that the country 
should concentrate on improving system operation. Consequently, this 
study makes policy suggestions to improve regulatory effectiveness 
through PPP by supplementing the facets that are well-equipped but not 
feasible with respect to regulatory policy cycle, regulatory governance, 
regulatory method, and conflict resolution. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
ecently, there are growing concerns over a “regulatory slowdown,” which 
cannot keep pace with the rapid progress of technological advances and the 
complicated connection of economic activities. One of the biggest causes is that the 
regulatory authorities are often less well-informed than their counterparts in the 
private sector. There are situations in which regulatory effectiveness cannot be  
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exerted by a government-led “command and control” regulatory framework, unlike 
as was the case with low levels of technological expertise and the simple economic 
structure of the past. In particular, when introducing innovative and convergent 
products that incorporate new technologies, the existing rigid and vertical regulatory 
system fails to accommodate them, thereby hindering growth engines. Examples 
include three-dimensional printers that have been confused because they do not fit 
into specific codes in the existing product classification scheme, and energy storage 
systems (ESS) which have struggled to clarify their legal status as a power generation 
equipment by function-based power system classification (see Lee, 2016, pp.151-
152 for more details of ESS case). 
In addition, there has long been a well-known problem regarding ambitious 
initiatives of regulatory reform failing to exert a substantial impact. One of the 
reasons for this is the misconception that improvements in regulations are regarded 
as a measure that incurs losses for a specific group or groups (Lee and Kim, 2015, 
p.30). That is, regulatory reform is difficult because it identifies beneficiaries and 
victims and drives them to a topic of preferential treatment. In the case of a large 
number of stakeholders surrounding regulatory matters, there may be positive or 
negative consequences of regulatory improvements. However, it should be 
recognized that regulatory reform is not used in solving conflict of interests, but in 
building rational institutions. For example, as the sharing economy, which provides 
new services by utilizing idle resources, emerges, the introduction and expansion of 
new business areas such as vehicle sharing and accommodation sharing are 
accelerated, and conflicts of interest with existing suppliers are inevitable. The focus 
of regulatory policy should be on maximizing the expected benefits and enhancing 
the welfare of society as a whole rather than protecting the interests of stakeholders. 
The expansion of public-private partnership (PPP) is suggested as a solution to the 
difficulties of regulatory reform when taking into account an increase in regulatory 
failures when confronting changing environments and conflicts of interest. However, 
it is not appropriate to make PPP a policy target. Rather, PPP is a necessary tool for 
policy formulation and implementation. In regulatory policy, the objective is to 
eliminate elements of market failure through the introduction and implementation of 
appropriate regulations and the adjustment of regulations in response to changes in 
circumstances. If the government fulfills the role of coordinator and achieves the 
allocative efficiency of resources as the outcome of regulatory policy, PPP is one of 
the input factors of the policy.  
Therefore, the necessity of PPP can be emphasized in two respects. On the one 
hand, increasingly complex and interconnected economic activities and rapid 
technological changes in recent years have provided an environment that makes it 
more difficult for governments to act unilaterally and dominant regulatory policies. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to consult and coordinate with a wide range of 
stakeholders for the purpose of eradicating defensive vested interests or rent seeking 
in accordance with stakeholders’ conflict of interests, and misunderstandings such as 
preferential treatment. 
In this regard, the purpose of this study is to determine the areas where PPP should 
be actively pursued and to suggest ways to improve regulatory effectiveness in South 
Korea. In so doing, this study attempts to identify areas where effectiveness should 
be improved by evaluating the system for PPP at the level of overall regulatory 
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policy, rather than analyzing it for specific industries or sectors. In order to do this, 
it aims to exploit the relatively weak aspects of regulatory policy in South Korea 
empirically, using objective data. 
PPP in the regulatory policy process can take various forms. It can be divided into 
the consultation and cooptation of private actors (stakeholders and experts), co-
regulation of public and private actors, delegation to private actors, and private self-
regulation in the shadow of hierarchy according to the relative size between 
government control and private autonomy (Börzel and Risse, 2005, p.199, Figure 2).  
According to the purpose of this study, an empirical comparison between forms 
of PPP is not appropriate because the form of PPP is uniquely determined by the 
specific conditions of the industry or the regulatee. Meanwhile, existing studies are 
either merely claiming the necessity of promoting PPP in the regulatory policy 
process due to lack of proper data (Lee, 2014) or presenting conceptual models with 
cases or results from a survey on a specific area (Shim, 2002; Kim, 2006; Seo, 2009; 
Kim, 2014a; Choi, 2015). In order to overcome the limitations of the existing 
literature, this study aims to conduct a quantitative analysis on this matter for the 
first time using recently published international data. 
The OECD surveyed the status of the regulatory system in member states through 
questionnaires and attempted to increase the credibility of the survey by requiring 
the provision of evidence in the responses. Using the data from 2014 and 2017, this 
study attempts to perform the principal component analysis (PCA) for categorical 
comparisons in methodology, oversight and quality control, systematic adoption, and 
transparency of stakeholder engagement, a widely applicable modality of PPP. 
A result of this analysis showed that the regulatory system of South Korea 
demonstrated remarkable growth in all four categories in 2017 compared with 2014. 
In particular, it ranked the highest in transparency. In the case of systematic adoption, 
the country’s system was evaluated highly together with many countries (15 for 
primary laws and 11 for subordinate regulations). This confirms that the country 
leads, or at least participates in, the increasing trend of systematic introduction of the 
participation of stakeholders. 
It should be noted, however, that these results do not measure the performance of 
regulatory reform, but rather assess the excellence of regulatory institutional settings. 
As seen in many surveys, the impact of regulatory reform in South Korea is low. The 
results of this study suggest that the PPP system in South Korea’s regulatory policy 
process is well-equipped across all four categories, but it needs improvement in 
implementation practices. In other words, measures should be taken to increase the 
practical effectiveness of the regulatory system to take advantage of its original intent 
in actual operation. 
To this end, we examined ways of enhancing PPP in terms of (a) regulatory policy 
cycle, (b) regulatory governance, which can be applied across all regulations, (c) 
regulatory methods and (d) coordination of stakeholders’ opinions, which are 
applicable to individual cases. 
Consequently, this study points out that (a) it is necessary to strengthen the 
consultation process with stakeholders in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA) so as 
to promote PPP from the design stage of the regulation, and (b) regulatory 
governance needs to be supplemented to utilize a PPP scheme such as listening to 
experts to enhance regulatory effectiveness. Moreover, it suggests that (c) it is 
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necessary to apply output-based regulatory methods instead of input-based ones to 
properly ensure the autonomy of the private sector. Finally, it proposes that (d) the 
public deliberation process should be introduced to overcome challenges in the case 
of regulatory issues where discussions are stalled by stark opposition between 
stakeholders. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes existing 
debates and discussions on the necessity and controversy of PPP in the regulatory 
policy process in South Korea. Section III attempts to identify the aspects of 
stakeholder engagement in the regulatory policy process in South Korea that should 
be emphasized when pursuing PPP in the regulatory policy process by conducting 
an empirical analysis to determine the categories that are weaker compared to other 
countries. Section IV derives improvement measures based on the results of the 
previous analysis. Finally, Section V is devoted to the concluding remarks. 
 
II. Existing Debates and Discussions 
  
The regulatory system in South Korea has been led by the government, and 
recently a review of the transition to the private-led system was proposed (Lee, 2014, 
p.5). In this section, we will examine the details to find a breakthrough by means of 
joint efforts of the government and the private sector in the process of regulatory 
policy in South Korea. In so doing, we focus on existing debates and discussions on 
the need for PPP as a practical alternative. 
 
A. Regulatory Culture and Need for PPP 
 
Sagong (2005) defined three specific characteristics of South Korea’s regulatory 
culture. First, there is regulatory universalism or excessive dependence on 
regulations, meaning that people believe anything can be done through regulatory 
measures. Second, there is a distrust of market and competition principles. Third, 
there is a patriarchal regulatory culture which advocates government protection of 
specific industries by means of regulations (Sagong, 2005, pp.45-47). The reasons 
for this include Confucian culture, a tradition of bureaucracy, experience of 
government-led economic development, and regulatory needs through lessons 
learned from negative cases (Sagong, 2005, pp.47-50). While the empirical 
explorations and relative comparisons of these arguments are beyond the scope of 
this study, this section seeks to identify the limitations of government’s direct 
command and control and the characteristics and difficulties of private participation 
in light of the specificity of the regulatory culture in South Korea. 
First, there is a problem of “disagreement with the field” which is pointed out as 
a limitation of excessive regulatory dependency and government’s peremptory 
behavior. When regulation is regarded as a public good, the application of regulations 
by the government is beyond the regulatory demands needed by the industry. Among 
reasons for such problems, we will highlight the incentive and capacity of regulators. 
The regulatee-oriented “active administration” is often referred to as one of the 
essential elements of regulatory reforms, but in fact, passive administrative treatment 
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issues have been brought about by regulators. Passive administration is caused by 
the incentive of the regulator to follow precedents or to conduct the task in a 
conservative manner to avoid any chance of reprimand in the evaluation of the work, 
such as auditing. Therefore, regulators tend to avoid blame in the process of drafting 
and enforcing regulations. As distinguished by Hinterleitner and Sager (2017), blame 
avoidance can be classified into “anticipatory blame avoidance” acting in preparation 
for future criticism and “reactive blame avoidance” behaving counteractively after 
an accusation. While the former behavior occurs mainly in the design of regulations, 
the latter behavior is observed mainly in the regulatory enforcement process. 
The regulator’s overbearing blame avoidance behavior can be a burden for the 
regulatees. From the perspective of anticipatory blame avoidance, the regulator may 
act to increase the so-called “inter-departmental barrier,” work only on those 
elements that can directly affect the accused, and offer incentives to facilitate the 
management of accusations in the future. A different stance of the relevant regulatory 
authorities due to such a particularism may incur unnecessary additional costs and 
time expenditures to the regulatee (Kim, 2014a, p.50). In case of infrastructure PPP 
projects, it was pointed out that the market was not activated in the early days after 
the enactment of the PPP Act due to the tendency of public officials to avoid any hint 
of suspicion regarding favoritism for large conglomerates, namely the Chaebol (Kim 
et al., 2011, p.7). Moreover, until recently, the trend toward regulatory strengthening 
has been maintained due to the burden of liability for the failure of the infrastructure 
PPP project (Hong and Kim, 2018, p.300) and the tendency to avoid public criticism 
(Kim, 2015, p.27).  
On the other hand, so-called “shadow regulation” is a representative example of 
reactive blame avoidance behavior during the enforcement of regulations, which 
means irregular discretionary actions by the regulator which are not based on laws 
or through excessive interpretation of laws. For example, in the case of self-
regulatory matters, which are forms of PPP, regulatory authorities have introduced 
restrictive opinions in practice at the time of revision of self-regulatory rules and 
regulations of the private associations (Financial Services Commission and Financial 
Supervisory Service, 2015, p.3). 
Second, the capacity of regulators is worthwhile to look at whether there is 
sufficient expertise and scale. For both, maintaining the government’s own direct 
command and control regulatory framework does not seem desirable. On the one 
hand, it is difficult to accumulate expertise due to the civil service’s application of 
frequent job rotations of its staff. We will not deal with this topic in depth since it is 
a problem for the overall administration, not only for regulations, and there are 
advantages to the acquisition of comprehensive knowledge in the training of senior 
officials and in anti-corruption programs. However, in the case of the RIA, which is 
mandated to recognize ex ante the impact of a newly introduced or strengthened 
regulation on the society, it is worth pointing out that public officials are not able to 
make a fully rigorous analysis due to the limitations of job expertise and analytical 
techniques (Lee, 2014, p.3). 
On the other hand, the insufficient number of regulatory personnel has also been 
pointed out frequently. For example, as shown in Table 1, regulatory personnel in the 
field of occupational safety in South Korea is in short supply when compared to the 
major countries. 
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TABLE 1—HUMAN RESOURCE ASSIGNED TO OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
Classification 
South 
Korea 
(2015) 
United 
Kingdom 
(2012)
Germany 
(2011) 
United 
States 
(2010) 
Japan 
(2010) 
Number of regulatory 
enforcement staff 406 2,432 4,405 3,878 1,400 
Number of 
industries 
Total number 
(in thousands) 2,367 2,149 3,734 8,571 2,622 
Number of industries per 
regulatory enforcement staff 5,830 884 848 2,210 1,873 
Number of 
employees 
Total number 
(in thousands) 17,969 29,721 37,475 127,820 52,488 
Number of employees per 
Regulatory enforcement staff 44,258 12,221 8,507 32,960 37,491 
Source: OECD (2017), p.33, Table 1 (Original Data Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor (South Korea), 
Health and Safety Executive (United Kingdom), Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (Germany), 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (United States), and Statistics Bureau (Japan)). 
 
B. Forms of PPP and Their Problems 
 
Next, we will look at what kind of PPPs are in South Korea’s regulatory policy 
process and what kind of problems are raised. First, in the context of the shortage of 
regulatory personnel, as in the case of occupational safety, co-regulation, in which a 
private self-regulation organization (SRO) regulates its members under the legal 
framework, has been in operation. Choi (2015) conducted a survey of regulatory 
officials, SROs such as business associations, member companies affiliated with 
them, and civic groups. The survey found that the greater the degree of government 
involvement in SROs, the greater the link between SRO and civil society, and the 
more rational the operation of SRO, the higher the effectiveness of co-regulation. 
Accordingly, he suggested (1) to establish a role-sharing system in terms of 
regulatory governance; (2) to seek measures to secure the effectiveness of co-
regulation; (3) to introduce screening and differentiated cooperation measures; (4) to 
secure public interest in, and the independence of, SRO; (5) to secure transparency 
in the operation of SRO; and (6) to expand participation of civil society for co-
regulation (Choi, 2015, p.286).  
The question raised here pertains to the imbalance between the external control of 
the government on the SRO and the internal control of the SRO on the member 
companies. Problems include a lack of competence and representation of the SRO, 
the unilateral dependence of the SRO on the government, complaints by members 
about the invalidity and unfairness of self-regulation due to the vertical relationship 
between the government and the SRO, the lack of substantial sanctions due to the 
SRO’s limited ability to control member companies, and the dual attitude of various 
interest groups (Choi, 2015, p.301). 
Second, by ensuring the participation of the private sector in regulatory reform 
governance, the government is taking measures to reflect the opinions of regulatees 
and stakeholders. Table 2 summarizes the transition of the regulatory reform 
implementation system and the private participation method in South Korea. Most 
notable is that the methods are oriented toward trouble shooting and complaint 
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TABLE 2—REGULATORY REFORM IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEM AND  
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION METHOD IN SOUTH KOREA 
Private 
participation 
“Participation 
administration”
“Lee Myung-bak 
administration”
“Park Geun-hye 
administration”
“Moon Jae-in 
administration” 
Resolution, 
deliberation, 
and 
consultation 
on regulation 
bills 
• RRC 
(DG for 
Regulatory 
Reform) 
• RRC 
(DG for Regulatory 
Reform) 
- Centered on review 
for new and 
strengthened 
regulation bills 
• RRC 
(DG for Regulatory 
Policy) 
 
• RRC 
(DG for Regulatory 
Policy) 
- Operation of 
advisory 
organizations 
(NIRIC, TRC, 
CAC) 
Requesting 
trouble 
shooting and 
complaint 
processing 
• Ministerial 
meeting on 
regulatory 
reform 
- Chaired by PM 
• PCNC 
- Assisting president 
on lump regulatory 
reform and 
regulatory policy 
 
• Ministerial meeting 
on regulatory reform 
- Chaired by president 
• On-site inspection 
meeting for 
regulatory reform 
- Chaired by PM 
• Meeting for 
coordinating state 
affairs  
- Chaired by PM 
• On-site 
conversation for 
regulatory reform 
- Chaired by PM 
• RRB 
- Lump regulatory 
reform 
• PPJRAI 
- field’s trouble 
shooting 
• PPJRAI 
- Field’s trouble 
shooting such as 
RTUF
• PPJRAI 
- Job creation and  
field’s trouble 
shooting 
  • RRS 
- Complaint 
processing 
• RRS 
- Complaint 
processing 
• Regulatory 
sandbox 
- Testing new 
technology 
Note: RRC=regulatory reform committee, DG=director general, NIRIC=new industry regulatory innovation 
committee, TRC=technical regulation committee, CAC=cost analysis committee, PM=prime minister, 
PCNC=presidential council on national competitiveness, RRB=regulatory reform board, PPJRAI=public-private 
joint regulation advancement initiative, RTUF=removal of the thorn-under-the-fingernail, RRSMG=regulatory 
reform Sinmungo. 
Source: The author’s augmentation to Regulatory Reform Committee (2018), p.4. 
 
processing handling regulatory difficulties and complaints typically through 
corporate site visits or by receiving opinions through online systems except the 
participation of private experts in the regulatory reform committee (RRC) to conduct 
reviews and decisions on new and strengthened regulation bills and provide 
consultation to the government. The OECD (2017) also assessed that the regulatory 
quality management in South Korea is demand-driven and guided by a complaint-
driven process (OECD, 2017, p.15). 
To reform unreasonable regulations, resolving complaints on a regular basis 
should be fully appreciated. For example, an online petition program for trouble 
shooting, namely “regulatory reform Sinmungo,” is regarded as an innovative case 
to expedite the processing time by limiting the response deadline to 14 days from the 
receipt date and effectively prevent regulators’ blame avoidance for regulatory issues 
by adopting a real-name system (OECD, 2017, p.27). However, allowing private 
participation based on such an ad hoc, case by case basis can be hardly seen as the 
central form of PPP under the fundamental regulatory reform governance. Therefore, 
it is necessary to pay more attention to PPP within the regulatory reform committee 
under the Office for Government Policy Coordination. 
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In accordance with the Framework Act on Administrative Regulations, South 
Korea established “the RRC under the jurisdiction of the president to deliberate upon 
and coordinate the government’s regulatory policies as well as comprehensively 
carry out matters concerning the examination and revision of regulations” (Article 
23 of the Act). Located at the top of the regulatory reform implementation 
governance, the RRC has two subcommittees depending on the characteristics and 
relevance of each sector: the economic division and the administrative/social 
division. The fact that it cannot fully utilize the expertise of private members who 
participate in each subcommittee has been identified as one of the biggest problems 
of the RRC (Choi, 2002, pp.27-28). In addition, it is clear that the range of authority 
to control regulatory contents is ambiguous, there is a problem with the composition 
and conflict of interests of committee members, and it is difficult to examine the 
regulations in various fields within only two subcommittees (Kang, 2013, pp.1-2). 
Some scholars argue that it is necessary to strengthen the status of the RRC or even 
further to establish it as an independent governmental organization (Choi, 2002; 
Kim, 2017), and that it should be given a stronger accountability and control 
measures (Kang, 2013). 
Third, there are cases where a formal or informal public consultation body is 
formed to overcome complex and intertwined interests and to derive optimal 
regulation alternatives by consensus. Typical examples include local councils to 
resolve regional issues, and temporary public consultation bodies to collect opinions 
and achieve consensus when the government plans to implement specific measures. 
In the process of regulatory policy, the mode of operation of public consultation 
bodies is mainly to encourage the participation of stakeholders by holding meetings 
to gather opinions, or to disclose information and gather opinions through public 
hearings. 
When the level of uncertainty or confrontation is high, it may be advisable to have 
a more formal and regular public consultation body. A representative example is the 
Bioethics Public Consultation Council, in which the government as well as private 
scientific, medical, industrial, legal and religious experts from the private sector 
participate to review the social and ethical issues of policy and regulatory matters on 
new technologies and to discuss countermeasures. The purpose of the Council is to 
discuss revisions to the bioethics law, when for example there is a demand for 
deregulation, such as the decision on whether to allow embryo research and gene 
therapy research, or in scope setting, so as to make decisions within the scope of 
ethical issues. To achieve this purpose, the establishment and operation of 
“deliberative governance,” which intends to resolve conflict by mutual understanding 
and cooperation, is necessary (Hong and Lee, 2009, p.25). However, deliberative 
governance in South Korea is not yet mature. For example, the Bioethics Public 
Consultation Council held a public hearing followed by eight discussions in 2017, 
but a researcher who attended the hearing had a negative assessment: 
 
“It was frustrating to see the opinion gap between field researchers and law and 
ethics experts. The level of discussion was also rudimentary considering that a public 
consultation body was formed and that counter measures were discussed” (Chosun 
Ilbo, 2017b). 
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Meanwhile, one of the main controversies over sharp conflicts of interest is 
dissension over the protection of vested interests. In many cases, a change in 
regulations may result in a group experiencing a decrease in the benefits previously 
enjoyed by new entrants. As the purpose of the public-private joint consultation is to 
resolve conflicts and to reach consensus through discussions among stakeholders, 
the public-private joint consultation body is often required to resolve conflicts 
between a group that seeks to minimize the reduction of its vested interests and 
another group that pursues newly created benefits. In this case, regulators can 
constitute a public-private joint consultation body to use it as a tool for blame 
avoidance. They may choose to postpone or discard a decision that could be 
criticized by at least one of the groups regardless of the conclusion, rather than use 
it as a measure of deliberative governance. 
 
III. Evaluating Stakeholder Engagement 
in Regulatory Policy of South Korea 
  
Bearing the above-mentioned stylized facts in mind, we attempt to diagnose how 
well the system for stakeholder engagement, as one of key modalities of PPP, is 
constructed in South Korea’s regulatory policy process. It is important to note that 
the main focus of this study is not to find the determinants of regulatory reform 
performance. Although the purpose of regulatory policy process improvement is to 
enhance the performance of regulatory reform, it is very difficult to examine the 
effects of a certain reform in the regulatory policy process in which various factors 
are combined and affect performance both directly and indirectly. Therefore, it 
attempts to diagnose the areas where increased efforts to improve should be made by 
understanding the relative weaknesses of current PPP implementation in the 
regulatory policy. In order to carry out such a determination, it is possible to adopt 
either a method of examination of the domestic regulatory policy process, or an 
international comparison of the regulatory policy processes. 
On the one hand, if only the regulatory policy process of South Korea is targeted, 
it is possible to comprehend the problems of each stage, but it is difficult to compare 
different stages. For example, it is incorrect to simply compare the number of 
stakeholder consultations between the regulation design stage and the stage of 
selecting the final regulatory alternative. This is because there are many things 
specific to a stage such as scope, form, and level of discussions, the scope of 
participants, and duration and cycle of meetings. Moreover, certain methods are not 
always the best alternative depending on the situation. Therefore, this type of 
research methodology is often applied to a specific case or a similar case group, and 
there is a limitation in generalizing the result. 
On the other hand, an international comparison of the regulatory policy processes 
poses difficulties in finding the best system for a specific country due to contextual 
differences in each country. The formation and settlement of the regulatory 
institution is highly path-dependent. However, it is possible to grasp the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of a country’s institutional setting compared to a generally 
acceptable setting at the global standard. For example, it is generally recognized that 
securing transparency in the decision-making process is something to be pursued 
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systematically. It will thus be meaningful to examine whether a country is 
appropriately equipped with such an institutional device when being compared to 
other countries. 
In this section, therefore, we attempt to identify the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of South Korea through comparisons based on credible data between the 
OECD member countries in various areas of a representative PPP scheme, namely 
stakeholder engagement, in the regulatory policy process. 
 
A. Data 
 
The OECD published a report on the indicators of regulatory policy and 
governance (iREG) of each member country in 2015 and 2018 through a 
questionnaire administered to central government officials and secondees to the 
OECD Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC). The data are as of the end of the 
previous years (i.e. 2014 and 2017), and include the survey results of national level 
regulatory institutions, except those at the sub-national level. The data for 2014 and 
2017 pertain to 34 OECD member countries and the European Union (EU) and for 
38 OECD member and accession countries and the EU, respectively. To secure the 
credibility of the data, the respondents were required to submit supporting data 
and/or documents, with which an evidence-based index was constructed. 
In so doing, the indices cover three important areas of regulatory policy: 
stakeholder engagement, RIA, and ex post evaluation. The indices on stakeholder 
engagement and RIA focuses exclusively on the central government’s regulatory 
policy practices for both primary laws and subordinate regulations. The ex post 
evaluation index, on the other hand, deals with post-regulatory assessments at all 
national regulations, regardless of whether they were initiated by parliament or the 
executive branch (Arndt et al., 2015, p.10). Let us focus on the iREG for stakeholder 
engagement, which is the main interest in this study. 
The indicators are composed of those that can be evaluated objectively, and those 
in which the indicator value changes in response to the change of actual regulation 
policy. They are classified into four categories: (1) methodology, (2) oversight and 
quality control, (3) systematic adoption, and (4) transparency. First, “methodology” 
investigates information on the methods used, for example, how often various forms 
of stakeholder consultation and feedback are made, and which forms are used for the 
consultation. Second, “oversight and quality control” includes the role of supervisory 
authorities and the feedback level of the evaluation results. Third, “systematic 
adoption” investigates the formal requirements, and how frequently these regulations 
were enforced. Finally, “transparency” examines information related to the 
principles of open government, including whether government decision processes 
and results are publicly available (Arndt et al., 2015, p.11). Table 3 shows the number 
of iREG indicators for stakeholder engagement in the regulatory policy process and 
the list of questions for calculating the corresponding indicator values can be found 
at the OECD website (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Methodology-
of-the-iREG-composite-indicators.pdf, accessed May 30, 2019). 
Therefore, the indicators used in the iREG are composed of those for judging the 
adequacy and rationality of the system established for the implementation of the 
regulatory policy process, and those for evaluating quantitatively the inclusiveness 
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TABLE 3—INDICATORS OF IREG FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Year Category Methodology Oversight and quality control
Systematic 
adoption Transparency Total 
2014 
Primary laws 36 12 7 25 80 
Subordinate regulations 36 12 7 24 79 
2017 
Primary laws 34 12 5 25 74 
Subordinate regulations 34 12 5 25 74 
Source: Arndt et al. (2015) and OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/ireg-source.htm, 
accessed Nov. 13, 2018). 
  
and appropriateness of the operation and execution of the system. It should be noted, 
however, that such indicators do not attempt to measure the performance achieved 
through changes in individual regulations. In other words, we can only judge the 
excellence of the system installed and operated in the regulatory policy process in 
terms of each category. Thus when interpreting the data, care should be taken to 
avoid misinterpreting or overstating the results as the performance of regulatory 
reform since the superior system does not necessarily guarantee excellent regulatory 
reform performance.  
The questions typically ask whether a system was constructed or enforced to 
obtain a binary response of “yes” or “no” and assign the values of 1 and 0 for “yes” 
and “no,” respectively. If not, it asks about the scope of application or the frequency 
of execution. In this case, a value is given according to the strength of the response 
in a range between 0 and 1. For example, in response to a question about whether 
each government department operates a homepage for ongoing stakeholder 
consultations, a value of 1 was assigned to the response of “all departments” and “all 
ongoing consultations” and a value of 0 was assigned to the response of “not 
operating.” At this time, a value of 0.5 was given to the response of “some 
departments” and “some ongoing consultations.” When asked if they have obtained 
statistics on stakeholder engagement, the survey obtained responses with “secured 
and open to the public,” “secured, internally kept” and “not secured,” whose assigned 
value is 1, 0.4, and 0, respectively. That is, if the implementation of the system is 
partial implemented as in the former example but the details are unclear, or if it is 
difficult to judge whether the partial implementation is biased in a specific direction, 
a value of 0.5 was given for the partial implementation. However, as in the latter 
example, the value assignment attempted to properly accommodate the situation in 
cases where partial enforcement is relatively close to “doing nothing.” 
In this way, an average of indicators with a value between 0 and 1 was calculated, 
and the scores of the four categories were obtained, and the scores of these categories 
were added together to constitute the final index value. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show 
the results of the scores by category and index values thus constructed, obtained from 
the data for 2014 and 2017, respectively. Notably, the rankings of South Korea had 
significantly improved in 2017 when compared to 2014: 10th to 5th and 15th to 7th 
for primary laws and subordinate regulations, respectively. However, this simple 
summation of scores in four categories may be misleading, as will now be discussed 
in greater detail below.  
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B. Method 
 
Let us look at two premises in dealing with the data. First, the division of the four 
categories of indicators is accepted as it is. This distinction is a result of deliberate 
determination of experts in the OECD RPC and its advisory body, the steering group 
on measuring regulatory performance over several years (see Arndt et al., 2015, 
pp.35-36 for an introduction to the index development process). 
 
 
(a) Primary Laws 
 
 
(b) Subordinate Regulations 
 
FIGURE 1. COMPOSITE INDICATORS FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN 2014 
Source: OECD (2015), p.74, Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. 
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(a) Primary Laws 
 
 
(b) Subordinate Regulations 
 
FIGURE 2. COMPOSITE INDICATORS FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN 2017 
Source: OECD (2018), pp.48-49, Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7. 
 
Second, taking average of indicator values with a value between 0 and 1 is 
considered an imperfect but realistic option to calculate the score for each category. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that it limits the relative importance by giving 
the same weight to the indicators in the category. However, this is an acceptable 
alternative because it is very difficult to accurately grasp the relative importance of 
more than 30 indicators, and in fact the relative importance is likely to be similar.  
Notice that it is obviously not correct to use the sum instead of the average because 
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the number of indicators included in each category is different. There are, however, 
cases where questions within the category, or between them, are not mutually 
exclusive or collectively exhaustive due to the nature of the data. In such cases, a 
simple comparison of the average values (scores) of different categories has two 
problems. 
First, there is the problem of double counting information represented by highly 
correlated indicators in the category. As the number of indicators in each category is 
large, as shown in Table 3, some questions are repeatedly asked about the 
establishment and implementation of essentially the same system. For example, the 
survey obtained a series of binary responses by asking about whether each of the 
listed forms of stakeholder engagement is used. In countries that actively engage in 
stakeholder engagement activities, it is likely that they use various forms. In this 
case, since the information is reflected in the average calculation, it exerts an 
excessive influence on the score of each category. 
Second, it is necessary to properly reflect the correlation between categories. The 
current indicator composition admits that indicators included in a particular category 
also indicate characteristics of the other category, but are not included in both 
categories. In this case, comparing the average using only the indicators in each 
category excludes the correlation between the two categories, and vice versa. For 
example, the questions about whether the government operates an interactive website 
for stakeholder consultation is similarly included in the methodology and transparency 
categories because the operation of it has meaning in both categories, rather than it 
being a problem with the structure of the questionnaire. On the other hand, operating 
such a website may be meaningful in terms of systematic operation, but it is not 
included in the systematic adoption category. In this case, the problem is that the 
correlation between methodology and transparency is exaggerated compared to their 
interaction and systematic adoption. 
In order to avoid such problems, we adopt a method of comparing the new 
parsimonious index value calculated so as to minimize any loss of information 
contained in the data. For this purpose, the principal component analysis (PCA), 
which is a typical method of feature extraction, is used. The PCA is a method in 
which the principal components are sorted in the order that best describes the 
variation of the original indicators through a combination of the variance-covariance 
relationship of the original indicators, from which some are taken. As a result, the 
analysis can facilitate the interpretation by reducing the dimension using the linear 
relationship of the data. 
In general, when there are four categories as in this study and category i  consists 
of in   indicators to constitute 4 1i in n==   indicators in total, the kth principal 
component 0kC  is a linear combination of all the indicators 1, , 4iijI i⋅ =   and 
1, , ,i ij n=  weighted by iij ka  as follows: 
 
(1)    4 1 10 , 1, 2, , .j ii i inik ij k ijC a I k n= == =    
The results of the PCA are reliable if the number of observations is sufficiently 
larger than the number of indices. Shaukat et al. (2016) noted that in spite of previous 
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studies that require more than 100 data points to obtain good results, it is difficult to 
obtain much data due to the nature of the object in many cases. Moreover, Forcino 
(2012), using a number of observations between 25 to 50, found that insufficient 
numbers of data points generated a bias, but that there is also a diminishing marginal 
effect of improving the result as the number of observations increased. Dochtermann 
and Jenkins (2011) showed that satisfactory results can be obtained even when the 
number of observations is only 19. If the correlation structure is high, the ratio of the 
number of observations to that of indicators is more important than the number of 
observations itself. The proposal of the previous study is to secure the number of 
observations at least twice to six times that of indicators (Shaukat et al., 2016, p.176). 
Generally, dozens of observations are obtained in comparative studies. The data 
in this study, numbered 34 to 40, may hence not be relatively too small. However, 
since the number of indicators reaches from 74 to 80, which is greater than the 
number of observations, the method of equation (1) cannot be used. Arndt et al. 
(2015), which used 2014 data for similar attempts to this study, tried to solve this 
problem by dividing each category into subcategories and using these subcategories 
as an indicator to conduct the PCA. However, as the authors have noted, the 
reliability of the results is limited due to the relatively large number of indicators 
compared to the number of observations (Arndt et al., 2015, p.21). Also, it is 
necessary to reduce the reallocation of indicators across categories as much as 
possible given the purpose of this study to find the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of South Korea among the four categories proposed by the OECD. 
Therefore, we adopt a method of taking the average value of indicators iI  in 
each category 1, , 4i =    to find the principal component kC   as the linear 
combinations of them such that  
 
(2)       4 1 , 1, 2, 3, 4,ik k ik iC e I e I k== ′ = =  
where 1 4( , , )k k ke e e= ′  is an eigenvector corresponding to an eigenvalue kλ  
obtained by the spectral decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
indicators. All principal components are independent of, or orthogonal to each other 
and the proportion of the kth principal component kC  explaining the variation of 
the data is 1 2 3 4/ ( ).kλ λ λ λ λ+ + +  By arranging the eigenvalues according to their 
size 1 2 3 4( ),λ λ λ λ≥ ≥ ≥  the principal components can be listed in the order of 
magnitude to describe the variation of the data. Among these listed 1 2 3 4( , , , ),C C C C  
we can select several principal components starting from 1C  that explain most of 
the total variation. The method of selecting the number of principal components 
includes the Kaiser criterion, the scree plot and the parallel analysis. 
The converted regulatory policy index of the countries included in the data can be 
calculated based on the ( 4)m <  selected principal component scores. This is a 
method of approximating the 4-dimensional index value by the principal component 
score of the m-dimension, because the information is lost at a ratio of 
1 2 4 1 2 3 4( ) / ( ).m mλ λ λ λ λ λ λ+ ++ + + + + +  as much as the dimension decreases. 
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Finally, the converted regulatory policy index can be interpreted using the biplots 
proposed by Gabriel (1971) and the Cleveland dot plots of all principal components 
based on the discussion of Cleveland and McGill (1984). 
 
C. Results and Discussion 
 
As a result of the PCA, two principal components were selected by all three of the 
above-mentioned criteria for primary laws and subordinate regulations in both of the 
2014 and 2017 data. The first and second principal components accounted for 64-67 
percent and 17-21 percent of the total variation, respectively.  
The biplots are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. All categories have the same 
direction on the basis of the first principal component, that is, as the size of the first 
principal component increases, the size of each category also increases. However, 
with the exception of the 2014 primary laws, the direction of the second principal 
component was divided into two groups in all cases; “methodology” and “systematic 
adoption” move in the same direction and “oversight and quality control” and 
“transparency” have the same direction. Based on these results and the questions 
contained in each category, it can be inferred that “methodology” and “systematic 
adoption” are related to the establishment of the system, while “oversight and quality 
control” and “transparency” are toward the implementation of the institution. 
The distribution of countries’ index values by category is shown as the Cleveland 
plots in Figure 5 to Figure 8. Also, the results of the PCA are summarized in Table 
4. From the distributions, averages, and medians of index values, countries can be 
evaluated to be equipped with good practices in the following order: systematic 
adoption, transparency, methodology, and oversight and quality control. To be more 
precise, we used the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test to determine whether there is a difference in the median of categories 
and in the distribution of indicator values, respectively. The results are shown in 
Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. The order of the median values in each category is 
generally similar to that of the previous at-a-glance observations, but there was no 
statistically significant difference between “methodology” and “transparency” at the 
0.05 significance level. Similarly, all the distributions of indicator values by category 
are statistically significantly different at the 0.05 significance level, and it is 
confirmed that there is no statistically significant difference between “methodology” 
and “transparency” except the 2014 primary laws.  
Moreover, from the coefficient of variation (CV) and Gini coefficient in Table 4, 
we can determine how countries’ index values are evenly distributed. In five cases 
(four cases in 2017 and one case in 2014) out of eight cases, countries are evenly 
evaluated in the order of systematic adoption, methodology, transparency, and 
oversight and quality control. In the remaining three cases, the rankings of two 
categories, methodology and transparency, are swapped. Together with the above 
results, this result suggests that systematic adoption is overall highly evaluated while 
oversight and quality control appears poorly across countries with respect to point 
evaluation and even distribution..
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TABLE 4—SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSES 
Year  
Primary laws Subordinate regulations 
M OQC SA T M OQC SA T 
2014 
Average .3557 .1681 .7233 .3958 .3429 .1776 .7274 .3898 
Median .3444 .1667 .7714 .3880 .3444 .1667 .7714 .4000 
Min .0278 0 .1429 .0400 .0278 0 .2000 0 
Max .6222 .6167 1 .7640 .6389 .6167 1 .7625 
Std. dev. .1728 .1287 .2258 .1852 .1603 .1314 .1887 .1877 
IQR .3111 .1667 .3143 .2608 .2667 .1667 .2143 .2813 
CV .4858 .7659 .3122 .4679 .4675 .7399 .2594 .4817 
Gini .2673 .3711 .1782 .2641 .2576 .3645 .1639 .2407 
2017 
Average .4026 .2066 .7395 .4499 .3863 .2109 .7262 .4397 
Median .4235 .1667 .8000 .4640 .3588 .1667 .8000 .4200 
Min .0882 0 .2000 .1200 .0294 0 .2800 .0400 
Max .6471 .6667 1 .7600 .6529 .6667 .9200 .7640 
Std. dev. .1497 .1667 .2039 .1863 .1429 .1702 .1752 .1722 
IQR .2206 .2083 .2200 .2680 .2147 .2333 .2400 .2160 
CV .3718 .8070 .2758 .4140 .3700 .8070 .2413 .3916 
Gini .2408 .3960 .1658 .2927 .1982 .4003 .1806 .2142 
Note: M=methodology, OQC=oversight and quality control, SA=systematic adoption, T=transparency, 
IQR=interquartile range, CV=coefficient of variation, and Gini=Gini coefficient. 
  
TABLE 5—RESULTS OF THE WILCOXON RANK SUM TESTS 
z value 
Methodology Oversight and quality control Systematic adoption 
2014 2017 2014 2017 2014 2017 
Oversight and 
quality control 
PL 4.34 4.91     
SR 4.25 4.42     
Systematic 
adoption 
PL -5.49 -5.95 -6.62 -7.00   
SR -6.19 -6.32 -6.95 -7.09   
Transparency 
PL -0.98 -1.26 -4.79 -5.12 5.35 5.49 
SR -1.04 -1.41 -4.66 -4.97 5.67 5.55 
Note: Looking at the difference between the row and the column, the positive numbers indicate that the median of 
the column is greater than the median of the column, and vice versa. The numbers in italics mean that they are not 
statistically significantly different at the 0.05 significance level. PL=primary laws and SR=subordinate regulations. 
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TABLE 6—RESULTS OF THE TWO-SAMPLE KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS 
z value 
Methodology Oversight and quality control Systematic adoption 
2014 2017 2014 2017 2014 2017 
Oversight and 
quality control 
PL .311 .300     
SR .267 .256     
Systematic 
adoption 
PL .888 .451 .971 .713   
SR .455 .441 .664 .669   
Transparency 
PL .541 .130 .647 .352 .677 .380 
SR .157 .160 .379 .313 .407 .380 
Note: The critical values in 2014 and 2017 are 0.2242 and 0.2102, respectively. The numbers in italics mean that 
they are not statistically significantly different at the 0.05 significance level. PL=primary laws and SR=subordinate 
regulations. 
 
We can now discuss individually the results for the countries overall and for South 
Korea. First, the countries have systematically adopted the stakeholder consultation 
process at a high level in the overall regulatory policy process, but the status of the 
system for oversight and quality control is relatively inferior to other categories. 
Methodology and transparency are located between them, but there is no statistically 
significant difference between methodology and transparency. However, interpretation 
of the results, in which the private participation is relatively insufficient in the 
oversight and quality control category, requires caution. It would be misleading to 
conclude that there is a need to promote stakeholder engagement in oversight and 
quality control, especially in the course of regulatory operations. This is because the 
role of government in the oversight and quality control of regulation may be 
relatively more important than in other categories. 
Second, the assessment results for the regulatory policy process in South Korea 
compared with OECD member countries are shown in Table 7, in which the country 
rankings by the simple average of indicator values are also compared. Overall, the 
rankings by the PCA in 2017 are higher than those in 2014. These results can be 
inferred from the fact that the regulatory system in South Korea has been improved 
by intensive regulatory reform efforts. In particular, it is encouraging to see that the  
 
TABLE 7— RANKING OF OECD IREG BY CATEGORY OF STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH KOREA 
 Year 
Methodology Oversight and quality control Systematic adoption Transparency 
PL SR PL SR PL SR PL SR 
PCA 
2014 9 (T2) 10  13 (T8) 15 (T7) 20 (T2) 23 (T2) 2  8 (T3) 
2017 5  5  5 (T2) 5 (T2) 4 (T15) 2 (T11) 1  3  
Simple 
average 
2014 13 (T2) 17  7 (T4) 8 (T5) 21 (T2) 22  11  17  
2017 19  16 (T2) 5  5  6 (T15) 5 (T11) 7  5  
Note: The numbers indicate the ranking of South Korea. The numbers in parentheses means the number of countries 
(including EU) that have the same value (e.g. T2 means two countries are ranked the same), and if there are no 
parentheses, there is no other country with the same rank. PL=primary laws and SR=subordinate regulations. 
VOL. 41 NO. 3    Stakeholder Engagement in Regulatory Policy of South Korea 63 
systematic adoption of stakeholder engagement, which was relatively insufficient at 
the end of 2014, has greatly improved in 2017.  
By year, the categories are evaluated in the order of transparency, methodology, 
oversight and quality control, and systematic adoption in 2014. Considering the 
result that the countries were highly evaluated altogether in terms of systematic 
adoption at that time, the lowest evaluation for South Korea in the category suggests 
that there is more room to improve the systematic stakeholder engagement in the 
country’s regulatory policy process. 
On the other hand, in 2017, South Korea ranked relatively high overall, especially 
in transparency. For systematic adoption, a large number of countries (15 for primary 
laws and 11 for subordinate regulations) ranked the same. In this regard, it would be 
more meaningful to interpret that South Korea is effectively leading the trend of 
systematically adopting stakeholder engagement by many countries rather than 
ranking itself. In addition, the fact that the ranking of South Korea in the oversight 
and quality control category in 2017, which has been generally evaluated at low 
levels across countries, is relatively weak compared to other categories and may 
suggest that more attention be paid to its promotion. However, this need not be 
emphasized since the relative gap with other categories is insubstantial. 
Finally, considering the simple average of the indicators in each category as 
implicitly shown in Figures 1 and 2, the rankings for South Korea in 2014 were in 
the order of oversight and quality control, transparency, methodology, and systematic 
adoption, while those in 2017 were in the order of oversight and quality control, 
systematic adoption, transparency, and methodology. This method should be avoided 
as discussed above, and remarkably there is a significant difference between the 
results of the PCA in this study and the simple average of indicators. 
In sum, the institutional basis of stakeholder engagement in the regulatory policy 
process in South Korea is considerably better than OECD member countries in all 
four categories from the quantitative perspective. This result cannot fulfill the 
original purpose of this study to identify relatively strong and weak categories. 
However, the well-established stakeholder engagement foundation within the 
regulatory policy process as an input element does not mean that the actual results 
of regulatory reform will increase. Ultimately, it will be necessary to identify the 
output according to the purpose of the regulatory policy. However, the effect of 
regulatory reform is directly related to the behavior of economic agents as mentioned 
above, and it is difficult to measure because it is the result of the interactions of 
various external factors.  
Alternatively, it is possible to gauge the divergence between supply and demand 
of regulatory reforms through the subjective assessment of the regulatory burden 
experienced by the economic agents. To this end, we collected the regulatory 
indicators from the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) annually announced by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF). The indicators are based on the results of the 
Executive Opinion Survey conducted on entrepreneurs in each country, in which the 
subjective responses to questions on regulatory policy ranged between 1 and 7 are 
collected. For South Korea, the 2018 indicator is a weighted average of 45 percent 
and 55 percent of the responses of 100 entrepreneurs in 2017 and 2018, respectively 
(Schwab, 2018, p.626). 
As shown in Table 8, the regulatory burden and efficiency perceived by South  
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TABLE 8— RESULT OF WEF EXECUTIVE OPINION SURVEY FOR SOUTH KOREA 
Code Classification Question Scoring Score Ranking 
1.08 
Efficiency of legal 
framework in 
challenging regulations
“In your country, how easy is it for 
private businesses to challenge 
government actions and/or regulations 
through the legal system?” 
1 = extremely 
difficult; 7 = 
extremely easy
3.5 57 
1.10 Burden of government regulation 
“In your country, how burdensome is it 
for companies to comply with public 
administration’s requirements (e.g. 
permits, regulations, reporting)?” 
1 = extremely 
burdensome; 7 = 
not burdensome
at all 
3.3 79 
1.11 
Efficiency of legal 
framework in settling 
disputes 
“In your country, how easy is it for 
private businesses to challenge 
government actions and/or regulations 
through the legal system?” 
1 = extremely 
difficult; 7 = 
extremely easy
4.0 50 
8.02 Hiring and firing practices 
“In your country, to what extent do 
regulations allow for the flexible hiring 
and firing of workers?” 
1 = not at all; 7 = 
to a great extent 3.7 87 
8.07 Ease of hiring foreign labor 
“In your country, how restrictive are 
regulations related to the hiring of 
foreign labor?” 
1 = highly 
restrictive; 7 = not
restrictive at all
3.7 104 
Note: “Ranking” refers to the ranking of South Korea among the 140 countries surveyed. 
 
Korean entrepreneurs is unsatisfactory compared with the superiority of the system 
established in the regulatory policy process. Furthermore, despite the ongoing 
regulatory reform efforts, the past decade’s trend in regulatory compliance burdens 
has been even more frustrating. As shown in Figure 9, the regulatory compliance 
burden of South Korea on the 7-point scale has fallen by 1.2 points over a decade, 
which is the largest drop (increasing burden) in OECD member countries. During 
the same period, the value increased by 1.7 points in Germany showing the highest 
increase (burden reduction). The results are, of course, not precise due to the 
limitation of the fixed effect of cultural differences or attitudes among countries. 
However, we can at least observe the sizable gap between the well-established 
system for PPP in the regulatory policy process found in this study and the 
 
 
FIGURE 9. PERCEIVED BURDEN OF COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
Source: OECD (2018), p.23, Figure 1.1. 
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regulatees’ unsatisfactory perceptions of the “quality” of regulatory policy 
implementation in South Korea. 
The result of this study is in line with previous studies pointing out the gap 
between institution building and practical implementation in South Korea. For 
example, Lee and Kim (2015) and Lee (2014) stated that:  
 
“The government, which was more agile than any other in establishing the 
regulatory system, paid the least attention to securing resources to actually operate 
the system” (Lee and Kim, 2015, p.22), and  
 
“South Korea has not been able to utilize the regulatory information system, 
established better than any other country, so it has failed to establish a virtuous cycle 
of regulatory policy that widely informs regulatory consumers of the status of 
government regulations and the performance of the regulatory reforms and uses 
public opinion on them as a driving force for another regulatory reform” (Lee, 2014, 
p.2). 
 
Kim (2014b) also found inadequacies in the government’s implementation of 
stakeholder engagement in South Korean regulatory reforms. One of the three 
reasons for the low perception of regulatory reform was the “passive collection of 
opinions” in the survey results regarding the perception of regulatory reform 
conducted by the RRC, the Federation of Korean Industries, the Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and the Korea Development Institute (KDI). The “extent to which the 
government gathers public opinions” marked the third lowest satisfaction level in the 
survey by the RRC. In the KDI survey, the lowest level of satisfaction with regulatory 
reform was seen in “communication with companies.” Among the problems of the 
government regulatory reforms viewed from the standpoint of the corporation, the 
second most common problem was a “lack of field communication and feedback.” 
In conclusion, the results of this study reaffirm the gap between the institutional 
setting and practical implementation of regulatory policy process. That is, the 
regulatory system in South Korea is overall well-organized in a quantitative sense, 
but it is necessary to raise the satisfaction level of regulatory targets by improving 
the quality of stakeholder engagement and consequently enhancing the operation 
more compliance-friendly. 
 
IV. Measures to Enhance Regulatory Effectiveness 
in View of Public Private Partnerships 
  
In this section, we propose measures to improve regulatory satisfaction and 
compliance by promoting PPP within the regulatory policy process. In particular, 
based on the results of the analysis, we look for measures to enhance the regulatory 
effectiveness through complementing operational issues that are under-performing 
while the system has already been established from the viewpoint of stakeholder 
engagement and further PPP. In so doing, the division of categories used in the 
analysis shall not be followed because, since they are all highly evaluated, comparing 
their relative superiority in the South Korean regulatory system is not critical.  
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FIGURE 10. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE REGULATORY POLICY PROCESS 
Note: Bold arrows indicate that participation and cooperation are more emphasized. 
  
Instead, we have divided a number of measures that can be applied to (1) all 
regulatory areas in common, and to (2) some individual cases, as needed. We also 
considered the partnership with stakeholders, public, and experts for each of these. 
On the one hand, common measures that can be applied across the regulations in 
general are classified into (a) a horizontal view of the regulatory policy cycle, and 
(b) a vertical view of governance encompassing regulations. On the other hand, the 
measures that can be applied to case-by-case are separated by (c) the method of 
regulation, and (d) conflict resolution for cases where the conflict of stakeholders’ 
opinions is sharp. Figure 10 shows the private participation in these activities. 
 
A. Activating PPP as Early as the Regulatory Design Stage 
 
To enhance regulatory effectiveness and compliance, it is necessary to actively 
introduce PPP from the design stage of regulations in the regulatory policy cycle. In 
fact, as shown in Figure 11, most OECD member countries listen to stakeholders 
toward the later stages of the regulatory setting (i.e. after the preparation of the draft). 
South Korea is also classified as listening to stakeholder opinions only in some 
primary laws and some subordinate regulations in the early stages (i.e. before the 
preparation of the draft). This suggests that it is necessary to listen to stakeholder 
opinions more actively in the early stages if there is a gap between the excellence of 
the regulatory system established and the actual unsatisfactory experience. 
At the regulatory design stage, the RIA is a tool that serves as a basis for judgment 
in the decision making process. It is a scientific and systematic method of analyzing 
the effects of regulatory changes on various stakeholders to find the optimal 
regulatory alternative when introducing or strengthening regulations. It is an 
important step in regulatory design, which is considered recently to be essential for 
promoting inclusive growth through better regulation (Deighton-Smith et al., 2016). 
Since 1998, South Korea has also been using the results of an RIA in the review 
of new and strengthened regulations at the RRC. From the perspective of PPP, the 
RIA in the country introduced a description of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) results, 
the results of the collection of stakeholder opinions, and the possibility of regulatory 
compliance. However, the present way is incompatible with the purpose of each of 
the above, and needs to be improved. 
(1) Common to all regulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) For individual regulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
Regulatory 
policy cycle
(b) 
Regulatory 
governance 
(c) 
Regulatory 
method 
(b)  
Conflict 
resolution 
Stakeholders 
Public 
Experts 
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(a) Primary laws (b) Subordinate regulations 
FIGURE 11. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE REGULATORY POLICY PROCESS 
Source: OECD (2018), p.51, Figure 2.9. 
 
First, while carrying out the CBA, the future costs and benefits for each 
stakeholder incurred by the impact of the regulatory alternatives should be 
calculated, but they are not performed extensively. At this time, regulatory 
alternatives are supposed to include non-regulatory alternatives which exclude direct 
regulatory features that limit or oblige the rights of the people. The non-regulatory 
alternatives include (1) economic incentives such as subsidies, tax reductions, and 
low interest loans, (2) social movements such as campaigns and public service 
advertisements, and (3) private self-regulation through associations (Office for 
Government Policy Coordination, 2018, p.24). In practice, however, there are few 
cases in which non-regulatory alternatives in the form of PPP are compared. This is 
related to the timing of, and the practical use of, an RIA. In many cases, an RIA is 
produced simply to provide the logical support for a specific regulatory alternative 
that the government has already chosen. Therefore, under the current practice, it is 
not possible to systematically review PPP alternatives. 
Second, most RIAs either state the outcome of the stakeholder comments very 
briefly, state that it will collect opinions through legislative notice, or do not write it 
at all. In the case of a legislative notice, it is difficult for a wide range of stakeholders, 
including the general public, to recognize the fact that the regulation will change due 
to the inherent limitations of the announcement method. 
By contrast, the Guidelines for the Preparation of RIAs issued by the Office of 
Government Policy Coordination states that it is necessary to identify all affected 
groups that will be influenced by the regulation prior to stakeholder feedback, and 
to be careful not to exclude each of them. Opinions from each of them should be 
collected through various methods such as round-table meetings, public hearings, 
and legislative notices, and be presented in concrete results (Office of Government 
Policy Coordination, 2018, p.26). 
Third, although it is required to describe the compliance possibility (predicted 
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compliance) of the regulatees to ascertain the effectiveness of the regulation, in many 
cases this item is also only a brief description and does not meet the original purpose. 
For example, when strengthening the conditions of the license, it is often the case 
that a statement may say something to the effect of “the compliance is high because 
the license can be granted only if the changed conditions are met.” However, to meet 
the original purpose of determining the appropriateness of the changed conditions 
from the perspective of regulatory compliance, it is necessary to predict the 
complaints or market contractions that can be caused by the enhanced conditions. If 
the new conditions impose unnecessary licensing costs on the producers, some of the 
producers may give up the acquisition of licenses due to high costs and eventually 
the market will shrink. 
Similar to the above, the system for this is also well designed. The Guidelines for 
this item require one to “scrutinize the regulatory compliance based on the 
circumstance to the regulatees and the compliance to regulatory affairs in similar 
area, and describe possible obstacles and their solutions” (Office of Government 
Policy Coordination, 2018, p.43). 
To improve the RIA system, it is necessary to establish a device that can actively 
consider non-regulatory alternatives, including PPP alternatives, and strengthen 
stakeholder engagement. Considering the practice of RIA in South Korea, the 
following alternatives can be considered. 
First, carrying out the CBA on non-regulatory alternatives, including PPP 
alternatives, can be strengthened to be compulsory. The RIA may mandate regulatory 
authorities to demonstrate superiority over non-regulatory alternatives as a basis for 
selecting a regulatory alternative. If no CBA is performed on non-regulatory 
alternatives, it should be noted that it is impossible to set the alternatives and its 
validity should be reviewed at the regulatory review. 
Second, to derive an effective and compliance-friendly PPP regulatory alternative, 
it can be made mandatory to specify the contents of consultation with the relevant 
SROs or civil society. As a result of the survey by Choi and Lee (2009), South Korea 
has established a total of 136 SROs in 122 laws. Moreover, it is also worth 
considering implementing a requirement to state in the RIA the plans for stakeholder 
engagement for interim and/or ex post evaluations of highly influential regulations. 
Third, the results of stakeholder opinion gathering, including the regulatory 
compliance possibility, may be required to be based on quantitative figures. That is, 
it is necessary to induce concrete PPP by quantitatively presenting specific 
consultation results such as the rate of approval for alternatives, the number of times 
public hearings are held, the number of participants, and the number of opinions 
collected online. Accumulating these data may also help procure feedback in the 
future. 
 
B. Improving Regulatory Governance through Substantial PPP 
 
As noted above, South Korea has installed the RRC as the highest body to 
deliberate and resolve regulations. The RRC operates the New Industry Regulatory 
Innovation Committee, Technical Regulatory Committee, and Cost Analysis 
Committee as its advisory body. It is hard to find countries with regulatory reform 
bodies like the RRC, with the exception of those advanced in regulatory reforms 
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such as Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (Lee and Kim, 2015, 
p.17). In addition, self-regulatory reform committees have been established and 
operate in the central government departments and municipalities. They all appear 
to be formally organized as a desirable form of PPP, the public-private joint 
committee.  
However, there remain problems related to the RRC, such as ambiguity of 
authority, conflicts of interest, and difficulties in the professional deliberation of 
regulations in various fields. It has also been pointed out that there are ups and downs 
in the status of the RRC due to a shortage of the necessary physical and human 
resources compared with the authority of the Committee (Lee and Kim, 2015, p.10). 
Rather than continuing a discussion on the status of the RRC, let us focus on possible 
improvements regarding PPP and regulatory governance. 
First, to compensate for the lack of resources of the RRC, it is necessary to 
establish a partnership with private experts and work closely together. Of course, it 
is the bureaucrats who actually lead the highest regulatory reform implementation 
mechanism, including the RRC. However, in reality, it is desirable to utilize the 
center of excellence capable of carrying out complementary consultation in 
situations where it is difficult to accumulate expertise of bureaucrats due to the job 
rotation system of public officials. A partnership for regulatory reform between the 
RRC and the Centers for Regulatory Studies installed in KDI and the Korea Institute 
of Public Administration should be expanded by reinforcing the functions of the 
centers, going beyond the verification of the results of RIA, including education and 
consultation for bureaucrats, support for experts in stakeholder consultations on 
important issues, and finding and evaluating regulatory maintenance tasks. For 
central government ministries and municipalities, similar systems can be constructed 
through partnerships with closely related and/or affiliated research institutes. In this 
case, it may be necessary to set up a center for regulatory analysis in each research 
institute to facilitate similar support. For example, the Korea Rural Economic 
Institute has established a Regulatory Impact Assessment Team which contributes 
substantially to the quality enhancement of RIAs of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Rural Affairs. 
Second, it is necessary to subdivide the subcommittees within the RRC, which is 
currently only two, to carry out a specialized review on various regulations. If it is 
practically difficult to increase the number of subcommittees, it should be ensured 
that a pool of private specialists is established for each subcommittee, and if 
necessary, consultations can be carried out intermittently to ensure professionalism. 
Third, if inter-ministerial consultations and coordination are needed, it is 
necessary to utilize private experts who can express neutral opinions. A system for 
listening to the opinions of private experts who have been granted independence can 
help in rational decision-making for important regulatory matters that have a broad 
scope and thus require coordination among ministries. 
 
C. Applying an Output-based Regulatory System to Strengthen the 
Autonomy of the Private Sector 
 
While it is undeniable that regulation is dominated by bureaucracies, the purpose 
of regulation is minimizing unnecessary burdens on regulatees and stakeholders, and 
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ultimately maximizing social benefits. The regulatory approach in South Korea is set 
on the basis of the input criteria to list and comply with the requirements for 
achieving the purpose of regulation, which is centered on regulatory authorities (i.e. 
the supplier of regulations). However, from the perspective of regulatory consumers, 
it is possible to give autonomy to regulatees to take a less costly approach, provided 
that the purpose of regulation is achieved. Such a way is an “output-based” 
regulating system in which the aim or achievement pursued by the regulator is 
presented, and the method for achieving the result is left to the autonomy of the 
regulatees. 
In the mid-2000s, for example, the deregulation of siting restrictions for the 
planned management area of the Seoul Metropolitan Area caused a serious increase 
in pollutant emissions. As long as the “input-based” permit conditions were met, a 
factory could be established in the area. Consequently, sites are overcrowded with 
small factories that did not install pollution control facilities or were unable to 
manage the pollutants (for more information, refer to Chosun Ilbo, 2017a). 
On the other hand, the regulatory approach of the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) in the occupational safety field in the United Kingdom is a representative 
example of applying the “output-based” control method. HSE has stated its 
regulatory approach as follows: 
 
“An important part of HSE’s regulatory approach is the choice and 
development of the most appropriate interventions to improve the management 
of health and safety risks. These could include; influencing and engaging with 
stakeholders and others in the industry, influencing large employers, creating 
knowledge and awareness of health and safety risks and encouraging behaviour 
change, promoting proportionate and sensible health and safety, inspection, 
investigation, enforcement, engaging with the workforce and working with other 
regulators and government departments” (Armitage, 2016, p.9). 
 
That is, through PPP, they conduct investigations of accidents and risk factors at 
workplaces, establish appropriate output standards, and encourage the application of 
the private sector’s creativity and efficiency by entrusting private autonomy to the 
way of achieving such goals. As a result, the number of fatal and major accidents in 
the construction industry has decreased remarkably. The number of deaths in the 
industry in 2012/13 decreased by 62 percent from 2000/01, before the system was 
introduced, and the number of serious accidents decreased from 4,410 to 2,161, to 
less than half (Armitage, 2016, p.22). 
For the application of such an output-based regulatory approach, appropriate 
supervision measures should be prepared. As shown in Table 1, however, there are 
many areas of weakness with regard to regulatory personnel in South Korea. To 
supplement this, it is possible to consider ways of strengthening the authority and 
responsibility of the SROs and giving them supervision and oversight functions. 
 
D. Promoting PPP for Progress in Discussions on Regulatory Issues with 
Sharp Conflicts of Interest 
 
It is often the case that stakeholders’ opposition to changes in regulations is so 
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sharp that making progress in discussions is not easy. In particular, for deregulation 
in newly emerging technologies and industries, some may oppose change due to a 
fear of the inherent uncertainties involved, or for the protection of their vested 
interest, which may in turn hinder technological and industrial developments. 
Considering the uncertainties, of course, it is necessary to review the risks associated 
with life, safety or the environment.  
In practice, to advance the discussions, there are many cases in which a public-
private consultation body is formed to coordinate opinions as we have seen in 
Section II. Nonetheless, there are a considerable number of cases in which progress 
in discussions, or outcomes resulting in consensus, has been poor. For example, 
expanding the service area of gene analysis firms by extending the range of allowed 
items for direct to consumer (DTC) genetic tests has long been discussed. In this 
case, consistent to the results of this study, a variety of stakeholder consultation 
systems and procedures were utilized but the actual outcome was insufficient. To 
consult with stakeholders, a public-private joint consultation body was installed and 
it held 11 public consultation meetings in which 15 experts from fields such as 
medicine, industry, ethics, science, and law participated. Public hearings were held 
to announce the results of the discussions and collect opinions. It formally provided 
sufficient opportunities for discussion, including with broad stakeholders, but the 
decision was delayed due to sharply conflicting opinions; sometimes the opinions of 
specific stakeholders were entirely excluded. As a result, it is clear that the 
international competitiveness of South Korean companies has weakened 
considerably in a global market that is expected to grow substantially in the future 
(Edaily, 2018). 
This is a case where discussions fail to make progress due to acute confrontations 
of stakeholders, and the government’s will to formulate better regulations and limit 
interventions proves insufficient. A possible approach to overcome this problem is 
to introduce a process of public deliberation, in which a “deliberate governance” is 
established to enable the formation of consensus through the participation of a wide 
range of stakeholders. Equipped with a neutral consultation mechanism, the 
deliberate governance enables consensus-oriented discussions based on the mutual 
trust of participants. 
The recently introduced “regulatory sandbox” allows for the testing or release of 
new products or services that do not exist in the market by not applying or deferring 
regulations under certain conditions, so that they will not be delayed or stymied by 
existing regulations. A regulatory case that presents a clear-cut conflict of interest 
may be tested with the use of the regulatory sandbox. To raise the institution’s 
effectiveness, it is necessary for such a case to apply the public deliberate process to 
the regulatory sandbox. 
Finally, as in the case of DTC genetic testing, consultation bodies for resolving 
conflicts in South Korea are typically formed after the conflicts have already 
progressed considerably and tend to be formed under pressure by a third party with 
strong political influence (Kim et al., 2018, p.237). Therefore, the government 
should be faithful in its role as mediator, and it will be necessary to manage various 
stakeholder claims based on fairness and rationality. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
  
With the emergence of fast developing technologies and new industries, the 
traditional government-led “command and control” regulatory framework is no 
longer valid in the design and implementation of rational and effective regulation. 
Therefore, this study sought to find ways to promote PPP in the process of regulatory 
policy to enhance regulatory effectiveness.  
To fulfill this purpose, it attempted to determine areas for improvement in the 
South Korean regulatory policy process using a quantitative analysis of evidence-
based data for the first time by identifying the relatively weak categories out of 
methodology, oversight and quality control, systematic adoption, and transparency 
in stakeholder engagement, one of the key modalities of PPP. From the results of the 
PCA, South Korea is evaluated as being at a very good level in terms of institutional 
setting in all categories as a result of recent intense regulatory reform efforts. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the outcomes of regulatory reform are still inadequate 
when compared to established systems suggests that the country should concentrate 
on improving system operations. 
Therefore, this study made policy suggestions to improve regulatory effectiveness 
from the viewpoint of PPP by supplementing the issues that are well-equipped but 
not feasible. First, it suggested the strengthening of the PPP from the stage of 
regulatory design by encouraging more participation of stakeholders in RIA. Second, 
it raised the need for improving regulatory governance to take advantage of 
substantial PPP with a wide range of private expert groups supplementing the lack 
of physical and human resources in the public sector. Third, it proposed the 
utilization of the private sector’s creativity and efficiency by applying the output-
based regulatory method and discarding the existing input-based method. Given the 
importance of supervisory oversight, it also pointed out the need to strengthen the 
roles and responsibilities of SROs. Fourth, it suggested the introduction of a public 
deliberation process to come up with solutions to challenging cases in which 
progress in discussions proved difficult due to conflicting opinions of stakeholders. 
Finally, in order to guarantee objectivity, the analysis conducted in this study 
compares only quantitatively the contents of the regulatory system related to PPP 
(stakeholder engagement, more precisely) due to the limitations of the data. 
Therefore, it should be noted that the qualitative aspect of the regulatory system in 
terms of PPP was not fully evaluated. In addition, a comparison between the 
excellence of the established regulatory system and the performance of actual 
regulatory reforms in view of PPP is beyond the scope of this study, and it is left for 
a future study. 
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